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NOTES
CONCLUSION
It would seem that today esthetic zoning is a valid exercise of the
police power. While at first the courts shied away from an ordinance
that had beautification as its primary objective, they later began to uphold
such an ordinance if it could in any way be coupled with some other
recognized purpose of the police power. In the park cases, the courts
began to broaden the concept of general welfare so that places of scenic
beauty, maintained for public benefit, could be kept unblemished by near-
by signs and billboards. Zoning ordinances which promoted that ob-
jective were upheld. Similar holdings have been to the effect that cer-
tain historic sections of a city could be kept intact, and that it was of
benefit to the public so to maintain them.
The Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin seem to have enunciated the principle that valid zoning regu-
lations may be enacted for esthetic considerations alone. Such regula-
tions have thus been held to be within the exercise of the police power,
since they promote the public welfare. But even though the courts have
held that reasonable esthetic zoning does not violate due process of law,
this by no means indicates that all forty-eight states will concur when the
opportunity arises. Rather, it indicates that the concept of general welfare
has been broadened to the point that esthetic considerations may be in-
cluded as a proper application of the police power.
To what extent esthetic considerations will satisfy the general welfare
test as a basis of zoning one may only conjecture. This much seems ciear
-the United States Supreme Court has indicated in Berman v. Parker, as
in other cases, that it has adopted a liberal policy and will not interfere
with the legislative function of giving content to the concept of general
welfare in the use of the police power.42 This attitude was well expressed
by Mr. Chief Justice Waite in the famous case of Munn v. Illinois:43
"We know that this is a power which may be abused, but that is no argu-
ment against its existence. For protection against abuses by legislatures
the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts."
ROBERT D. CocamN
Beneficiaries Behind the Iron Curtain
Consider the following hypothetical case: Decedent, a domiciliary of
Ohio, leaves a will which directs that a legacy of $5000.00 be paid to his
cousin A who lives in Hungary. The executor has affirmative evidence that
' Cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, (1955); Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); Liggett v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105,
114 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting opinion).
'94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876).
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A is alive. In view of the existing political situation the executor is in a
quandary. If the money is paid to A or his consular representative it is at
least likely that some or all of the money would be confiscated by A's gov-
ernment. Thus, whether testator's direction is obeyed or disobeyed his in-
tent will not in fact be fulfilled. The same problem would arise if A stood
to inherit property by intestate succession.
Until recently there -was no statute in Ohio which would aid the execu-
tor or administrator in his dilemma. The statute respecting the death of a
devisee or legatee has no bearing on the case.' There was no statutory
authorization to do anything but pay the legacy to A.
It was to provide for such situations that the Ohio General Assembly
recently enacted two new statutes:
Ohio Revised Code, Section 2113.81. Where it appears that a lega-
tee or a distributee, or a beneficiary of a trust not residing within the
United States or its territories will not have the benefit or use or control of
the money or other property due him from an estate, because of circum-
stances prevailing at the place of residence of such legatee, distributee, or a
beneficiary of a trust, the probate court may direct that such money be
paid into the county treasury to be held in trust, or the probate court may
direct that such money or other property be delivered to a trustee which
trustee shall have the same powers and duties provided in section 2119.03
of the Revised Code for such legatee, distributee, beneficiary of a trust or
such persons who may thereafter be entitled thereto. Such money or other
property held in trust by such county treasurer or trustee shall be paid out
by order of the probate judge in accordance with section 2113.82 of the
Revised Code.
The county treasury shall not be liable for interest on such money
held in trust.
Ohio Revised Code, Section 2113.82. When a person entitled to
money or other property invested or turned into the county treasurer or to
a trustee under section 2113.81 of the Revised Code satisfies the probate
court of his right to receive it, the court shall order the county treasurer or
the trustee to pay it over to such person.
These statutes became effective October 6, 1955. Thus under the cir-
cumstances of the hypothetical case, Ohio has authorized a deferment in the
distribution of the property. It should be observed that Section 2113.81
does not treat the question of the right of such a person as A to be a legatee,
distributee, or beneficiary of a trust. It leaves such right unaffected. It
deals only with the distribution of property, and provides that while the
requisite conditions obtain, distribution may be deferred.
The statute has a potentially wide application. Ohio, and this entire
part of the country, has a substantial population of persons born in countries
in which current conditions might justify its application. Table I indicates
OHio Rev. CODE § 2107.52.
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the number of persons residing in four large Ohio cities who were born
in five such countries.
Cincin- Cleve- Colum- Youngs-
nati land bus town
Czechoslovakia 216 21,957 188 6,947
Hungary 1,913 21,204 694 4,120
Poland 918 23,054 413 3,351
Rumania 764 2,967 179 2,018
U.S.S.R. 2,628 12,265 1,001 1,987
Total 6,439 81,447 2,475 18,423
TABLE 1
Table 2 summarizes the same statistics for the entire state.
5
Czechoslovakia 38,208
Hungary 43,410
Poland 41,820
Rumania 9,167
U.S.S.R. 23,114
TABLE 2
Thus, in 1950 there were living in Ohio more than 155,000 persons
who were born in the above-mentioned five-countries. They constituted
more than 35% of the total foreign born population. These figures would
seem to make it apparent that this statute is likely to be used quite fre-
quently in the future.
The statute under consideration is not novel Other states have adopted
similar laws.4 The New York and New Jersey statutes are somewhat
broader than the Ohio statute, in that they declare that payment may be de-
ferred, in addition to the same reasons mentioned in the Ohio statute, "where
other special circumstances make it appear desirable that such payment
should be withheld."
Quite a different statute has been enacted in California,5 where the right
of a non-resident alien to take any property (whether by succession or testa-
mentary disposition) is made dependent on the right of citizens of the
United States to take property upon the same terms and conditions as
residents of the country where such alien is an inhabitant. Such right is
also dependent upon the right of citizens of the United States living in the
21950 United States Census of Population, Report P-B35, p. 99 (Reprint of Vol. 2,
Part 35, Ch.B.) U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952.
'Id. at 64.
"Examples of similar statutes are: 20 PA. STAT. (Decedents' and Trust Estates) 5
1156; N. Y. Surrogates' Court Act § 269; N. J. STAT. 3A:25-10; MAss. GEN. LAWS,
ch. 206 § 27A.
5 CALIF. PROB. CODE § 259. See also CALIF. PROB. CODE § 1026 which requires a
non-resident alien who becomes entitled to property by succession to appear and de-
mand the property within five years from the time of succession or be barred.
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United States to receive by payment to them money originating from the
estates of persons dying in such foreign country. Thus, in California the
tight to receive property from a decedent's estate is conditioned by the
above facts.6
It would appear that the Ohio statute has a double purpose. The prin-
cipal objective is to preserve property for non-resident alien distributees
until such time as they can actually receive, use, and enjoy such property.
The second objective (a corollary of the first) is to prevent property from
being confiscated -by the government of the distributee's country of resi-
dence.
The statute should accomplish these purposes satisfactorily. The pro-
bate court is given the wide discretion which it needs to decide individual
cases. Yet, in the administration of the statute, certain problems will arise
which the statute itself does not resolve.
For instance, the statute sets no limitation on the length of time prop-
erty may be held in trust. After a number of years a great deal of property
may be tied-up in such trusts with little or no likelihood that the intended
recipient will ever be able to have the enjoyment of it. Will such trusts last
indefinitely or only for a "reasonable" time? There is no authority in the
statute for the court to order such trusts terminated at the end of a reasonable
6 The two Ohio statutes that were enacted were contained in Amended Substitute
House Bill 638, 101st General Assembly, Regular Session, 1955-1956. The bill as
originally introduced, House Bill 638, was quite different from that enacted, and it
bore a striking resemblance to CALIF. PROB. CODE § 259, supra. The original bill
provided.
Sec. 2105.16. "No person who is capable of inheriting shall be deprived of
the inheritance by reason of any of his ancestors having been aliens. Aliens may
hold, possess, and enjoy lands, tenements, and hereditaments within this state, either
by descent, devise, gift, or purchase, as fully as any citizen of the United States or of
this state may do.
'The right of aliens, not residing within the United States or its territories, to
take real property in this state by succession or testamentary disposition, upon the
same terms and conditions as residents and citizens of the United States, is dependent
in each case upon the existence of a reciprocal right upon the part of citizens of the
United States to take real property upon the same terms and conditions as residents
and citizens of the respective countries of which such aliens are residents. The right
of aliens not residing in the United States or its territories to take personal property
in this state by succession or testamentary disposition, upon the same terms and con-
ditions as residents and citizens of the United States, is dependent in each case upon
the existence of a reciprocal right upon the part of citizens of the United States to
take personal property upon the same terms and conditions as residents and citizens
of the respective countries of which such aliens are residents."
Sec. 2105.161. "The burden shall be upon such nonresident aliens to establish
the fact of existence of reciprocal rights as set forth in section 2105.16 of the Revised
Code."
Section 2105.162. "If such reciprocal rights are not found to exist and if no heirs
other than such aliens are found eligible to take such property, the property shall be
disposed of as escheated property."
(March
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time, or at any time, except as provided in Section 2113.82. It seems that
such trusts will last indefinitely in the absence of additional legislation.
Is the statute mandatory? Must the probate court apply the statute when
facts justifying its use are established? Must an executor attempt to have
the statute applied when the circumstances are appropriate? Apparently the
answer to all these questions is "no." The statute declares that the probate
court "may direct" that property be held in trust. This is permissive. It
gives no directions to the executor. There does not seem to be anything
mandatory in the language of the statute. However, a declaratory judgment
should be available to the executor who seeks direction from the court.
As has been mentioned, Section 2113.81 does not refer to the right of a
legatee, distributee, or a beneficiary of a trust to take the proceeds of an
estate, but rather it provides for a deferred distribution of such proceeds
in certain circumstances. Yet Section 2113.82 declares that when a person
entitled to property held in trust under the provisions of Section 2113.81
"satisfies the probate court of his right to receive it" the court shall order
such property paid over to him. Thus, Section 2113.82 refers to a right
to receive property, and there is an apparent contradiction between the two
sections. A plausible construction is that one has a right to receive prop-
erty under Section 2113.82 when the conditions calling for the application
of Section 2113.81 have ceased to exist.
Does Section 2113.81 apply to inter vivos trusts? It refers to a bene-
ficiary of a trust, but shortly thereafter refers to "money or other property
due him from an estate." The word estate does not necessarily mean a
decedent's estate, but may refer as well to a trust estate or the estate of a
living person. However, the statute empowers only the probate court to
act. Since the probate court has jurisdiction over testamentary trusts and
the common pleas court has jurisdiction over inter vivos trusts, the statute
apparently is applicable only to testamentary trusts, and the answer to the
above question is "no." There is no reason for limiting the application of
this statute to testamentary trusts, but the statute appears to do so.7
It is possible that Section 2113.81 is vulnerable to a constitutional at-
tack. The United States Supreme Court has declared that,
Rights of succession to the property of a deceased, whether by will or
by intestacy, are of statutory creation, and the dead hand rules succession
only by sufferance. Nothing in the Federal Constitution forbids the legis-
lature of a state to limit, condition, or even abolish the power of testa-
mentary disposition over property within its jurisdiction.8
7 Title 21 of the OHIo REV. CoDE is entitled "Courts-Probate- Juvenile." Chap-
ter 2113 is entitled "Executors and Administrators -Appointment; Powers; Duties."
Thus the location of section 2113.81 in the code gives no suggestion of an intended
applicability to inter vivos trusts.
8 Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942). This case involved the ap-
plication of a state statute to prior antenuptial agreement.
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However, the statute impels one to ask whether a state, having granted
the power of testamentary disposition, and having declared that non-resident
aliens may receive property from decedent domiciliaries, may qualify the
distribution of such property as the statute under consideration would do.
The question may properly be raised. Yet, since the issue is at least in
doubt, the statute should be upheld because of the conditions precipitating
its application. It is to be applied only when the intended recipient can-
not then receive the property. The long-term effect of the statute's appli-
cation is to attempt to carry out the testator's intention (or the direction of
the statute of descent and distribuion) as soon as possible.9
May heirs, beneficiaries, or successors in interest of legatees, distributees,
or beneficiaries of trusts claim money deposited with the county treasurer or
property turned over to a trustee? The statutes are not altogether dear.
Section 2113.81 declares that the probate court may order that money "be
paid into the county treasury to be held in trust" or it "may direct that such
money or other property be delivered to a trustee ... for such legatee, dis-
tributee, beneficiary of a trust or such person who may thereafter be entitled
thereto." Does this mean that successors to distributees may claim property
which has received Section 2113.81 treament only if it has been turned
over to a trustee but not if it has been turned into the county treasury? It
is doubtful that the legislature intended this result. A liberal and realistic
construction of the statute would result in the words "legatee, distributee,
beneficiary of a trust or such person who may thereafter be entitled thereto"
being applied to either of the alternative courses of action available to the
probate court. But how liberal will be the treatment accorded this statute?
Perhaps the question is answered in Section 2113.82 which refers to "a
person entitled to money or other property invested or turned into the
county treasurer or to a trustee." The distinction herein mentioned is un-
reasonable and without foundation, but does it exist?
Is property held in trust under Section 2113.81 subject to attachment?
There is no reason why such property cannot be attached to the same extent
that any other property in the state may be attached.
One of the most interesting problems in the application of this statute
will lie in establishing the facts required to justify its utilization. It may
become necessary to prove a political situation as a fact. What evidence
will be sufficient to show such facts? What degree of likelihood that the
"The New York Court of Appeals has declared that § 269 of the Surrogate's Court
Act is not unconstitutional. In re Braier's Estate, 305 N.Y. 148, 111 N.E.2d 424
(1953). The United States Supreme Court dismissed an appeal for want of a sub-
stantial federal question. 346 U.S. 802 (1953). The U.S. Sup. Ct. denied cer-
tiorari in a case in which the above-mentioned CALIF. PROB. CODE § 259 was ap-
plied in In re Arbulich's Estate, 41 Cal.2d 86, 257 P.2d 433 (1953), 346 U.S. 897
(1953), 347 U.S. 908 (1954). See also 170 A.L.R. 953.
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distributee will not receive his proceeds must be shown to justify the appli-
cation of Section 2113.81? We are fortunately not without some indication
of the treatment other jurisdictions have given these questions. Writers
have declared that under such a statute the property may be directed to be
paid into court "if it appears, even contingently possible, that it would be
subject to confiscation in whole or in part if turned over to the foreign
consul or an attorney-in-fact. .. 10
A New Jersey probate court has declared that funds should be preserved
until there are "convincing assurances" that distributive shares will reach
their proper destination." Although this statement bears on the duration of
the order rather than its being granted in the first place, it casts some light
on the problem under consideration.
A California appellate court has declared that where treaties or statutes
are before a court their construction may be a matter of law. The question
of how a foreign country has construed and applied such treaties or statutes,
however, is one of fact. This fact must be ascertained in order to determine
the right of a non-resident alien to receive property under the California
statute.
12
A New York case involving legacies to persons in Czechoslovakia and
Hungary placed great weight on the unfair exchange rate, the rationing and
price conditions in Czechoslovakia under which the beneficiary could buy
goods with the money only at greatly increased prices, and the extent of
confiscation by the government. It concluded that the distributees could
not be said to be getting "the benefit or use" of the property.la The court
also referred to a federal statute which directs that no draft on the credit
of the United States be sent to a foreign country where the postal, trans-
portation, or banking facilities, or the local conditions, are such that the
Secretary of the Treasury has determined that there is not a reasonable
assurance that the payee will actually receive the check and be able to nego-
tiate it for full value.14 Hungary and Czechoslovakia had been determined
by the Secretary to be in that category, and the court reasoned that there
was no cause to suppose that a private draft had a greater probability of
reaching a payee than a draft on the United States.
The testator also left a legacy of $5000.00 to a certain small town in
2'34 CJ.S., Executors and Administrators, § 497 (c).
'In re Volencki's Estate, 35 N.J. Super. 351, 114 A.2d 26, 27 (1955). ... since
nothing is taken away and all is preserved until the court receives convincing assur-
ances that distributive shares will reach their proper destination, common obstacles
on the way should be sufficient."
'In re Leefer's Estate, 127 Cal. App.2d 550, 274 P.2d 239 (1954).
'SIn re Wells' Estate, 126 N.Y.S.2d 441, 204 Misc. 975 (1953).
" 31 U.S.C. § 123. See also Treasury Department Circular 655, dated March 19,
1941, and especially amendments of February 19, 1951 and April 17, 1951.
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